Lest we grow complacent...
May. 10th, 2004 05:37 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
electriclandInteresting op-ed by Peter Desbarats in this morning's Gazoo. It's subscriber-only so I'm going to snurch. Sorry, CanWest.
I will probably write more about this whole prison affair soon, but suffice it to say for now that it makes me very upset and sad.
Lessons from Somalia
Americans could learn thing or two about the causes of military abuses by reading Canada's report on the Somalia affair
PETER DESBARATS
Monday, May 10, 2004
"From its earliest moments, the operation went awry. The soldiers, with some notable exceptions, did their best. But ill-prepared and rudderless, they fell inevitably into the mire that became the Iraq debacle."
I've substituted Iraq for Somalia in the above paragraph. With that edit, I'm happy to offer the opening lines of our 1997 report to the U.S. authorities who are now investigating the killing and abuse of Iraqi prisoners. In fact, I'll gladly provide them with the whole five volumes of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, although none of them is as interesting as the missing volume - the one about political responsibility that we were never allowed to write.
Although the scale of the American invasion and occupation of Iraq is vastly greater than the Canadian role in the U.S.-led peace enforcement mission in Somalia in 1992-93, it now looks as if both had many of the same problems. And just as Canadians were horrified by initial reports in the media of murder and mistreatment of prisoners by Canadian soldiers, Americans are reeling under the impact of even more explosive revelations.
In both cases, the behaviour of some soldiers seems to contradict the most fundamental qualities of our two democracies and the very image we have of ourselves. It is this horrified reaction that U.S. President George W. Bush and senior members of his administration are now trying to express in press conferences and speeches, to identify themselves with it before it turns hostile and overwhelms them.
The Canadian experience indicates how problematic this strategy might be as various U.S. inquiries start to investigate the outrages in Iraq.
The initial tendency in Somalia, and now in Iraq, was to try to isolate and confine the issue - the "few bad apples" approach. The U.S. soldiers who were photographed abusing Iraqi prisoners are being treated by Bush and Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as renegades, aberrant members of a heroic and disciplined army. I can predict that this tactic won't survive the first serious investigations into the selection and training of troops for the Iraq invasion.
Our own inquiry revealed that, under pressure to assemble an overseas force to meet an unrealistic political timetable, military leaders skimped on training. More critically, soldiers who were known to have disciplinary problems were shipped overseas while some senior officers crossed their fingers and hoped for the best. Predictably, these same soldiers often caused trouble during the mission. I wouldn't be surprised if the same scenario repeated itself in the U.S. forces sent to Iraq.
In 1992, Canadian soldiers and officers were sent to Somalia with little specific training for peace enforcement and little knowledge of Somalia's complex history and society. (Training for peacekeeping has since been included in basic military training in Canada.) Judging from the text of a remarkable radio address last week by a U.S. soldier who spent 10 months in Iraq, returning last February, U.S. troops have suffered from the same deficiencies. According to the Associated Press report of his speech, Paul Rieckhoff described "too little support and too little planning" in the early days of the invasion, problems that became worse as the mission progressed.
"We had 19-year-old kids from the heartland interpreting foreign policy, in Arabic," he said. "This is not what we were designed to do. Infantrymen are designed to close with and kill the enemy."
As a platoon leader, Rieckhoff experienced critical shortages that hampered his mission and endangered his men - "not enough vehicles, not enough ammunition, not enough medical supplies" and even not enough water. These factors presumably contributed to frustration among U.S. soldiers and a breakdown of morale as "the people who planned this war watched Iraq fall into chaos and refused to change course."
In this kind of scenario, in Somalia and presumably in Iraq, the "few bad apples" signified widespread problems among military ranks up to the highest levels. At first, according to our 1997 report, Canadian senior officers "refused to acknowledge error." When pressed, "they blamed their subordinates." We've already seen the beginnings of the same type of response among those in charge of prisoners in Iraq.
So the critical questions, once the initial shock of the revelations has moderated, relate to the degrees of knowledge and accountability within the higher ranks of the military and ultimately at the political level leading, in the case of Iraq, to the president. This is where the Canadian experience is truly relevant to the one now beginning to unfold in the United States.
Like Bush, former prime minister Jean Chretien and members of his cabinet expressed horror at the initial reports of murder and abuse of prisoners by Canadian soldiers. The defence minister of the day went so far as to disband the famed Airborne Regiment. But when the Somalia inquiry started to gather evidence of widespread cover-up of abuses, starting in the field and leading toward National Defence Headquarters, and when these threatened to involve senior bureaucrats and members of the cabinet, the prime minister closed down the inquiry (announced by the defence minister, but authorized by the prime minister, it's safe to assume).
The American situation, at first glance, seems to involve even more widespread cover-up because of the number of victims and some indications that the killings and abuse of prisoners has been occurring for some time. As in Canada, official reaction to the outrages occurred only after they were revealed by the news media.
It remains to be seen whether the U.S. investigations will follow a trail right into the Oval Office or, taking a leaf from Canada's book, be halted at the doorstep of the White House.
Peter Desbarats was one of three commissioners on the 1996-97 Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia.
Ottawa Citizen
I will probably write more about this whole prison affair soon, but suffice it to say for now that it makes me very upset and sad.
Lessons from Somalia
Americans could learn thing or two about the causes of military abuses by reading Canada's report on the Somalia affair
PETER DESBARATS
Monday, May 10, 2004
"From its earliest moments, the operation went awry. The soldiers, with some notable exceptions, did their best. But ill-prepared and rudderless, they fell inevitably into the mire that became the Iraq debacle."
I've substituted Iraq for Somalia in the above paragraph. With that edit, I'm happy to offer the opening lines of our 1997 report to the U.S. authorities who are now investigating the killing and abuse of Iraqi prisoners. In fact, I'll gladly provide them with the whole five volumes of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, although none of them is as interesting as the missing volume - the one about political responsibility that we were never allowed to write.
Although the scale of the American invasion and occupation of Iraq is vastly greater than the Canadian role in the U.S.-led peace enforcement mission in Somalia in 1992-93, it now looks as if both had many of the same problems. And just as Canadians were horrified by initial reports in the media of murder and mistreatment of prisoners by Canadian soldiers, Americans are reeling under the impact of even more explosive revelations.
In both cases, the behaviour of some soldiers seems to contradict the most fundamental qualities of our two democracies and the very image we have of ourselves. It is this horrified reaction that U.S. President George W. Bush and senior members of his administration are now trying to express in press conferences and speeches, to identify themselves with it before it turns hostile and overwhelms them.
The Canadian experience indicates how problematic this strategy might be as various U.S. inquiries start to investigate the outrages in Iraq.
The initial tendency in Somalia, and now in Iraq, was to try to isolate and confine the issue - the "few bad apples" approach. The U.S. soldiers who were photographed abusing Iraqi prisoners are being treated by Bush and Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as renegades, aberrant members of a heroic and disciplined army. I can predict that this tactic won't survive the first serious investigations into the selection and training of troops for the Iraq invasion.
Our own inquiry revealed that, under pressure to assemble an overseas force to meet an unrealistic political timetable, military leaders skimped on training. More critically, soldiers who were known to have disciplinary problems were shipped overseas while some senior officers crossed their fingers and hoped for the best. Predictably, these same soldiers often caused trouble during the mission. I wouldn't be surprised if the same scenario repeated itself in the U.S. forces sent to Iraq.
In 1992, Canadian soldiers and officers were sent to Somalia with little specific training for peace enforcement and little knowledge of Somalia's complex history and society. (Training for peacekeeping has since been included in basic military training in Canada.) Judging from the text of a remarkable radio address last week by a U.S. soldier who spent 10 months in Iraq, returning last February, U.S. troops have suffered from the same deficiencies. According to the Associated Press report of his speech, Paul Rieckhoff described "too little support and too little planning" in the early days of the invasion, problems that became worse as the mission progressed.
"We had 19-year-old kids from the heartland interpreting foreign policy, in Arabic," he said. "This is not what we were designed to do. Infantrymen are designed to close with and kill the enemy."
As a platoon leader, Rieckhoff experienced critical shortages that hampered his mission and endangered his men - "not enough vehicles, not enough ammunition, not enough medical supplies" and even not enough water. These factors presumably contributed to frustration among U.S. soldiers and a breakdown of morale as "the people who planned this war watched Iraq fall into chaos and refused to change course."
In this kind of scenario, in Somalia and presumably in Iraq, the "few bad apples" signified widespread problems among military ranks up to the highest levels. At first, according to our 1997 report, Canadian senior officers "refused to acknowledge error." When pressed, "they blamed their subordinates." We've already seen the beginnings of the same type of response among those in charge of prisoners in Iraq.
So the critical questions, once the initial shock of the revelations has moderated, relate to the degrees of knowledge and accountability within the higher ranks of the military and ultimately at the political level leading, in the case of Iraq, to the president. This is where the Canadian experience is truly relevant to the one now beginning to unfold in the United States.
Like Bush, former prime minister Jean Chretien and members of his cabinet expressed horror at the initial reports of murder and abuse of prisoners by Canadian soldiers. The defence minister of the day went so far as to disband the famed Airborne Regiment. But when the Somalia inquiry started to gather evidence of widespread cover-up of abuses, starting in the field and leading toward National Defence Headquarters, and when these threatened to involve senior bureaucrats and members of the cabinet, the prime minister closed down the inquiry (announced by the defence minister, but authorized by the prime minister, it's safe to assume).
The American situation, at first glance, seems to involve even more widespread cover-up because of the number of victims and some indications that the killings and abuse of prisoners has been occurring for some time. As in Canada, official reaction to the outrages occurred only after they were revealed by the news media.
It remains to be seen whether the U.S. investigations will follow a trail right into the Oval Office or, taking a leaf from Canada's book, be halted at the doorstep of the White House.
Peter Desbarats was one of three commissioners on the 1996-97 Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia.
Ottawa Citizen
